A Gatekeeper Embraced: - Sargon Relies on - the Daubert Trilogy
Thus, Sargon instructs that under Sections 80l(b) and 802, a trial court may exclude expert opinion testimony "that is (1) based on a matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on rea sons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative." (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 771-72.) Moreover, "Other provisions of law, including decisional law, may also provide reasons for excluding expert opinion testimony." (Id. ATP. 772.) This arguably constitutes a sweeping confirmation that California courts have the power to evaluate the basis of expert opinion testimony. A Gatekeeper Embraced: - Sargon Relies on - the Daubert Trilogy Another striking aspect of Sargon is the Court's repeated references to the Daubert trilogy. As a threshold matter, Sargon did not alter Leahy's "general acceptance" test - or Leahy's rejection of Daubert - in the context of testimony regarding "new scientific techniques." (Sargon, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772 fn.6.) But in the context of expert opinion on timony not involving such techniques, the Court explicitly drew on the Daubert trilogy. It did so, first, in adopting the notion that "trial courts Los Angeles business lawyer have a substantial 'gatekeeping' responsibility" in evaluating such testimony. (Id. at p. 769 & fn.5; see also id. at p. 770 ["[T]he trial court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude speculative or irrelevant opinion[.]"]; id. at pp. 771-72 [same].) Indeed, in holding that a trial court may examine whether the material on which an expert purports to rely "actually supports the expert's reasoning," the Court quoted Joiner, supra, in explaining that a trial court "may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." (Id. at p. 771 [quotation marks and citation omitted].) The Court further relied on the Daubert trilogy in setting limits on the power to evaluate expert opinion testimony. Warning that "courts must... be cautious in excluding expert testimony," the Court quoted Daubert in explaining that "the gatekeeper's focus 'must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate."' (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772 [citation omitted].) The Court also explained that a trial court "must not weigh an opinion's probative value or substitute its own opinion for the expert's opinion," but must "simply determine whether the matter relied on can provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or whether that opinion is based on a leap of logic or conjecture." (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772.) Courts do not "resolve" scientific controversies; rather, they are to conduct a "circumscribed inquiry" to determine whether the materials relied upon adequately support the conclusion that the expert's opinion is valid. (Ibid. [quotation marks and citation omitted].) Noting that the "goal of trial court gatekeeping is simply to exclude clearly invalid and unreliable expert opinion" (ibid. [quotation marks and citation omitted]), the Court echoed the guiding principle stated in Kumho Tire, supra, that the "gatekeeper's role" is to ensure that an expert "employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field" (ibid. [quotation marks and citation omitted]).
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